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Sluggish growth in low-income countries, despite the high performance in other 
economic indicators, motivates the literature to switch attention to institutions. 
Despite its crucial economic implications, there is limited attention on rent-seeking 
as a driver of economic growth in low-income countries. This paper investigates the 
effect of rent-seeking on growth in low-income countries from 2004 to 2017 using the 
system generalized method of moments estimator. The empirical results reveal that 
rent-seeking negatively affects growth, implying that it obstructs the pace of economic 
development in low-income countries. Hence, it is necessary for policymakers in 
these countries to adopt anti-rent-seeking policies to promote a rapid and sustainable 
growth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world’s socioeconomic condition has witnessed significant progress since the 
past two decades (World Bank, 2017). Credits have been given to globalization in 
the aspects of rapid technological diffusion and greater access to capital and global 
markets, which has in turn led to unprecedented rates of economic growth (Wang, 
1990). As a result of globalization, resources, know-how, and technologies have 
been increasingly diffused at a rapid rate across nations, hence policy solutions to 
promote further progress proliferate. While these increasing trends have helped 
many nations and mankind to progress, other regions and populations seem to 
have been left behind due to violence, slow growth, and limited opportunity for 
improvement (Gwartney et al., 2006). This is because effective policies leading 
to positive and sustainable economic growth have not been adopted or are 
poorly implemented in these regions (World Bank, 2017). In other words, while 
the development policies around the globe have prioritized the policies and 
interventions needed for improving outcomes, little attention has been paid to 
analyze the reasons why these policies and interventions succeed in some nations 
or regions but fail in others.
While countries generally have a set of common development objectives, 
namely promoting economic growth and the sustainability of the development 
process, their policies do not always produce the same desired outcomes and 
contradictions do exist in reality. The common culprit associated with these 
contradictions seems to be institutional malfunction including pervasive rent-
seeking activities, which channel resources from the productive sectors to the 
unproductive sectors of these economies (Brooks et al., 1990). Accordingly, 
challenges faced especially by developing countries, which include weak delivery 
of services, violence, sluggish growth, natural resource curse, and the most 
prominent issue—rent-seeking—require reconsidering the process by which state 
and non-state agents interact to design and implement policies in such a way that 
uphold institutional quality for mitigating rent-seeking activities (Auriol, 2006). 
The objective of our study is to examine the effect of rent-seeking activities on 
economic growth in low-income economies.
Rent-seeking refers to the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank, 
1997). It involves expenditure by interest groups in the form of lobbying/bribery 
to obtain advantageous treatment from the government through public policy like 
regulation, taxation, and subsidies (Krueger, 1974). Particularly, the rent-seekers 
look for an opportunity to spend money in lobbying governments’ decisions in 
order to gain extra ‘rent’ by bending these decisions in their favor. The existence 
of rent-seeking activities in an economy is a sign of poor institutional quality 
(Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011). This is because they create a distortion to the cost and 
incentive structure of an economy, trigger waste and misallocation of resources as 
public investment/funds might be channeled to unproductive sectors (See Barro, 
1991), and destroy the development potential of the best entrepreneurs (Auriol 
et al., 2016). Hence, rent-seeking results in the reduction of economic efficiency 
through the misallocation of resources by governments, and ultimately impede 
economic growth and development. 
In developing economies, where economic growth plays an especially 
important role in economic development, issues related to institutional quality 
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seem to be a significant factor of the limited progress in economic development 
(Valeriani and Peluso, 2011). Based on the reports of the International Country 
Risk Guide and the Transparency International, we observed that the control 
of rent-seeking activities is weak, as indicated by low scores of Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) for Low-Income Countries (LICs) when compared to the 
group of Middle-Income Countries (MICs) and High-Income Countries (HICs). 
We also observed that countries (such as Norway, Denmark, Finland, Netherland, 
New Zealand, and Singapore), which have been achieving high Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita are those that have better control of corruption, as 
indicated high scores of the CPI, and hence low level of rent-seeking activities. By 
contrast, nations (such as Tajikistan, Papua New Guinea, Madagascar, and Sierra 
Leone, Cambodia) characterized by low CPI scores(or high rent-seeking activities) 
are those with low GDP per capita and hence are LICs. See Table 1 for selected 
related literature.1 
In these countries, quantitative control or quantitative easing has served as 
a by-product of the governments’ attempts to affect the pace of development 
through centralised planning (Blomqvist and Mohammad, 1986). A centralized or 
authoritative planning process is exposed to limited competition and transparency, 
rent-seeking activities, a reduction in productivity and efficiency, and hence 
restricts economic growth (Blomqvist and Mohammad, 1986). Generally, the 
economic issues that exist in developing countries are often brought about by the 
side effects of such control by elites or self-interest groups. On the other hand, the 
public sector, alongside civilian and military bureaucracies tend to be organized 
naturally for collective action in the urban areas. 
Motivated by institutional as well as growth-related issues faced by developing 
economies, this study employs the system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator to investigate the effect of rent-seeking activities on economic 
growth in LICs. We focus on LICs because these countries are experiencing an 
increasing trend of rent-seeking activities. It is observed that LICs have shown 
lack of effort to control rent-seeking activities. Based on the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators report (i.e. World Governance Indicators, 2017), a majority 
of the LICs have experienced a decrease in the CPI score during the period 2010-
2017, indicating that the efforts and the level of control of rent-seeking activities 
have been low in these countries. The report also revealed that the LICs’ average 
CPI score is 26.59, which is far lower than the those of Middle-Income Countries 
(MICs) and High-Income Countries (HICs). 
This study is crucial to the existing literature and the policy arena for a couple 
of reasons. First of all, it focuses on the institutional quality of the countries as 
the key driver of economic growth rather than the conventional drivers such as 
labor, human and physical capital accumulation, investment, among others (Juhro 
et al., 2020). Good quality institutions provides a country an incentive framework 
on transaction costs and the interaction among economic agents, which in turn 
influence the country’s overall economic development (see North, 1991). 
1 See https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2017/index/nzl 
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Second, this research is also relevant to the literature in the sense that its 
empirical results affirm the ‘sand’ or ‘grease’ on wheels hypothesis/puzzle and 
hence provide a clear and robust finding as compared to the mixed findings 
of prior studies in the literature. Our focus on LICs is unique to the literature 
because the existing studies on the rent-seeking–economic growth nexus mainly 
analyze the relationship in a wide scope of heterogenous countries (see Huang, 
2016). The empirical findings and policy recommendations of these studies would 
suffer from the one-size-does-not-fit-for-all issue. Thus, the focus on the LICs by 
our is adequate because these countries desperately need high and sustainable 
growth to move upward to a higher economic ladder; they are also commonly 
deemed to have suffered from weak institutional quality in general (Blomqvist 
and Mohammad, 1986; Mishra et al., 2014).
Given the weak institutional and economic situations in LICs, we ask the 
following questions: What is the specific political determinant of economic 
growth in the LICs? What is the main obstacle impeding economic growth in 
these countries? While Comoros, Senegal and Zimbabwe were upgraded to lower 
middle-income status, there have been debates regarding why other countries 
retained their LICs status (Federal Reserve of St Louis, 2015)2. In order for LICs to 
move upward to a higher ladder, understanding the key determinants of economic 
growth is essential.
To enhance sustainable economic development in LICs and hence rid them 
of the poverty trap, enhancing the quality of institutions appears to be inevitable. 
However, to our knowledge, there have been limited research examining the 
effects of rent-seeking activities on economic growth in LICs. Instead, the literature 
mainly focuses on High-Income Countries (HICs) and on the MICs (see Auriol et 
al., 2016). This paper contributes to the literature in this regard by investigating the 
effect of rent-seeking behaviour on economic growth in LICs. The empirical finding 
of this study provides explanation to policymakers in the LICs as to why their 
countries have been persistently facing difficulties in stimulating and sustaining 
rapid economic growth despite the extensive efforts made by governments to 
attract more FDI, capital accumulation, etc. In other words, the finding provides 
policymakers in these countries a clear direction on the key aspect of the economy 
to be focused on especially when the conventional macroeconomic policies are 
ineffective to boost and to sustain growth and hence to move upward to a higher 
economic ladder. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II develops the theoretical 
framework. Section III explains the methodology. Section IV describes the data. 
Section V reports the empirical results and interprets the findings. Section VI 
concludes and provides the policy implication of the paper.
2  Majority of the low-income countries are earning 30 to 50 times lower (and sometimes even less than 
$1000 per year in 2014) per capita income compared to high-income country like the United States. 
Based on the existing data, it takes around 170 to 200 years to converge to the United States living 
standards, by assuming that the growth rate of the United States remains constant at 2 percentage 
point per year. On the other hand, for middle-income countries to converge to high-income countries, 
they need to achieve growth rate of at least 11 percentage point per year continuously for 40 to 50 
years. This implies that it is even more difficult for the low-income countries to catch up with the 
high-income countries in term of growth. Hence, the limited pace of income convergence and the 
relative income traps (faced by the low-income countries) appear to be real problems.
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To examine the effects of rent-seeking activities on economic growth, the basic 
theoretical framework of the study is based on the work of Barro (1991) and Mauro 
(1995) in which general production function is expressed as:
where Y represents total output level; T refers to total factor productivity; K and L 
refer to capital and labor, respectively. Where t represent the time subscript and i 
represent cross section. The total differentiation of Y is given as:
(1)
Dividing Equation (2) by Y yields a decomposition similar to Solow (1956)3:
Equation (3) can be explained by using Schumpeterian growth theory of 
economic development4, whereby it distinguished two components the progress 
of an economy. The first relates to the growth component associated with 
the growth rate in capital and labor under the changes in factor availability. 
The second relates to the development component associated with the forces 
driving total productivity growth in the production function under social and 
technological changes (Schumpeter, 1961). The said components are characterized 
as the following:
where GRt represents the growth rate of real GDP; γit refers to the total factor 
of productivity; IYit denotes the investment-output ratio; and dLLit represents 
the growth rate of labor. The marginal productivity of capital is shown by FIY; 
the output elasticity of labor is FdLL; and Fγ is assumed to be equal to 1,where t 
represent the time subscript and i represent cross section.
To examine economic growth based on the general productivity function of 
Barro (1991), few variables will be included into the model: factors of production 
like capital formation, labor force, population, and others. Essentially, to capture 
rent-seeking activities, CPI is used as the proxy for these activities. Thus, our 
growth model can be illustrated by the following function:
3 This equation is used to examine the difference in growth performance across countries and differs 
from the traditional growth studies.
4 The Schumpeterian growth theory attempts to explain the gap between growth and economic 
development across countries. Besides, it analyses institutional development in a simple framework 
to capture the concept of growth-enhancing policies or how institutions may change based on the 
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in which the growth components include labor force, capital, and population, 
other than rent-seeking. To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the estimated 
coefficient capturing the effects of rent-seeking activities on growth, it is crucial to 
control other growth determinants.
The rent-seeking activities tend to decrease economic growth through the 
misallocation of resources, and reduction in the efficiency and transparency of 
public administration(see Auriol et al., 2016). Therefore, poor institutional quality 
creates an opportunity for rent-seekers to find their own special interest and 
redirects resources—wealth is redistributed by violating regulations. However, 
in the context of LICs especially, rent-seeking activities are heterogeneous (Iqbal 
and Daly, 2014) as institutional quality differs by countries. For example, the rule 
of law is not equally effective, property rights are not equally well defined and 
democratic rights are not equally extensive, and these elements differ across LICs. 
Following that, there is still a debate on whether rent-seeking activities are ‘sand 
or oil to machine’ and hence the existing literature regarding the hypothesis is still 
inconclusive.
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation
To include lagged dependent variables in our empirical models indicates that there 
is a correlation between independent variables and the error term since the lagged 
dependent variables (i.e. first lags of economic growth, lagged dependent income 
inequality, and public expenditure) depend on , which is a function of the 
 (i.e. lag of country specific effect). Due to this correlation, Eq. (6) will suffer 
from the dynamic panel bias. In other words, under the fixed effects estimator, the 
country-specific effect error term would be wiped out within the transformation. 
However, , the correction between the transformed error term and 
the transformed lagged dependent variable is a function of 1/T, indicating that 
when T is large the correlation would only be negligible. Otherwise, the standard 
fixed effects estimator would be biased downwards. Therefore, by employing 
the system GMM estimator introduced by Arellano-Bond (1991), we basically 
differences the model to remove any time-invariant country-specific effects. The 
system GMM estimator treats all regressors are stationary by differencing them, 
and thus it eliminates the problem of endogeneity caused by the correlation of 
the country-specific effect and the independent variables. This study examined 
19 LICs (N) and period cover from 2004 to 2017 (T), fulfilling the requirement 
that N > T for correct application of the system GMM estimator. There should 
be no concern regarding the small number of time series observations, because 
the size of the cross-sectional dimension of the panel determines the asymptotic 
properties of the system GMM estimator. The one-step and two-step system GMM 
are asymptotically normal under this setting. The difference between one-step and 
two-step system GMM is that the two-step system GMM estimator provides small 
variance asymptotically as compared to the one-step system GMM estimator. 
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Besides, using an optimal weighting matrix, the two-step system GMM estimator 
outperforms the one-step system GMM estimator because the former generates 
lower bias and standard errors compared with the former. Overall, the system 
GMM estimator has flexibility and allows lags of the endogenous variables to be 
efficiently incorporated in the model. Thus, this allows for many instrumental 
variables to be used in the estimations. To avoid potential proliferation of 
instruments, we truncate and collapse lags to reduce the instrument count in the 
system GMM estimation. 
B. Empirical Approach 
Our dynamic empirical economic growth model, which includes a lagged 
dependent variable, is as follows:
where subscripts i and t refer to country and year, respectively; RGDPG is the real 
GDP per capita growth; RS is rent-seeking; LBF is total labor force; CP is gross 
capital formation; and POP is the total population. u is the error term that contains 
country- and time-specific fixed effects, uit=μi+εt+vit, where vit is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
The prefix “ln” represents the natural logarithm; αi is the country-specific constant 
term; and γ,β1,β2,β3 and β4 are the slopes of the respective estimated parameters. In 
addition, the lagged dependent variable is incorporated into the model in order to 
account for temporal dependence on the previous real GDP per capita growth of 
the current, which can justify the gradual changes in economic growth. 
Theoretically β1 is expected to carry a negative sign to indicate that higher rent-
seeking activities tend to impede economic growth. Rent-seeking is a sign of deep 
institutional weakness, and causes a lower rate of investment and expenditure (in 
education and health), widening income inequality, decreasing foreign investors’ 
confidence, and increasing social cost, thereby retarding economic growth. 
Based on the mainstream rent-seeking theory literature, rent-seeking has 
adverse effects on the public welfare (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). On the one hand, 
this is because part of the resource rent-seeking agents is not directed to goods and 
output growth. On the other hand, it is distracted by the institutional conditions 
created for reallocation of already created value in the interest of the respective 
lobbying agents. This, in turn, indicates a societal loss in two forms, namely the 
loss of production volume due to wastage of resources to obtain rents, and the loss 
due to inefficient handling/issuing of property rights. These costs often outweigh 
the amount of possible rent obtained. What is more interesting is that there might 
be competition among economic agents for a monopoly position in the industry. 
In the process of competition, losers expend resources rather than invest in the 
production of goods. The expended resources or funds are, in turn, redistributed 
to the competition’s winners, and ultimately providing no welfare or benefit to the 
society as a whole(Tullock, 1967).
(6)
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The redistribution activity that deplete resources, i.e. rent-seeking activity, is so 
costly to growth for two reasons. Firstly, rent-seeking activities exhibit very natural 
increasing returns. In other words, an ascent of rent-seeking activities leads these 
activities to be more attractive, compared to productive activities, and ultimately 
results in multiple equilibria in the economy, with “bad” equilibrium exhibiting 
substantially high levels of rent-seeking, but low level of output. Particularly, 
there are three mechanisms through which the increasing returns in rent-seeking 
influence economic growth. One of them is the fixed set-up cost of rent-seeking 
system like a legal code. Once set up, lawyers can sue each other’s clients cheaply 
and easily, which they could not do so otherwise. Besides, rent-seeking would be 
self-fulfilling because offence paves ways for a demand for defence. For example, 
if a customer hires lawyer, his supplier will do likewise, thereby leading to a form 
of increasing returns. The last mechanism is the “strength in numbers” possessed 
by the rent-seekers. If only a few people were involved in burglary, they would 
tend to be caught. However, if many of them steal, the chance of being caught is 
much lower, and, therefore, the returns to looting are higher. All these mechanisms 
that depend on increasing returns to the aggregate rent-seeking technology could 
reach multiple equilibria, some of which have an extremely high level of rent-
seeking and a low level of income. 
Secondly, rent-seeking activities, especially by public officers, tend to impede 
innovation more than the private rent-seeker. Since innovation serves as one of the 
key engines of growth, public rent-seeking, as compared to production, retards 
growth in a more extreme manner. In particular, innovators need government-
supplied goods like import quotas, licenses, permits, and others alike much more 
than incumbent producers. Based on the discussed theoretical foundation, the 
rent-seeking activities hypothesis—high rent-seeking activities reduce economic 
growth—is developed and therefore, β1 is expected to be negative. 
Other than the main explanatory variable (rent-seeking), it is also important 
to theoretically analyze the linkage between the control variables, namely labor/
human capital, physical capital, and population, and economic growth. While γ, 
β2, and β3 are expected to be positive, β4 is expected to carry a negative sign. We 
also estimate Eq. (6) using the systemin GMM estimator. To ensure the consistency 
of the system GMM estimates, we performed two types of specification test, 
namely Sargan’s over-identifying restriction test and the serial correlation test of 
the disturbance (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
the Sargan test would imply that the instruments are valid and hence the model 
is correctly specified. In the serial correlation test, on the other hand, a rejection 
of the null hypothesis under the AR(1) and AR(2) tests imply absence of first and 
second order serial correlation.
IV. DATA 
We use CPI as the proxy for rent-seeking. According to Iqbal and Daly (2014), rent-
seeking is considered as any activity in which public power is exercised for private 
gain including the misuse of public resources. The rent-seeking dataset is obtained 
from World Governance Indicators (WGI) and Transparency International (TI). 
The sample period of the dataset spans from 2004 to 2017. 
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The descriptive statistics of the variables (in logarithms) are summarized in 
Table 2. Economic growth, which is the dependent variable, is proxied by real 
GDP per capita growth and is measured in constant 2010 USD (obtained from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database compiled by the World Bank). 
The highest value of economic growth per capita is 4.435%, while the lowest 
value is -0.261%. Other than that, the variability of economic growth per capita 
is 0.285%, while the average value is 3.236%. Rent-seeking activities, proxied by 
the CPI indices (obtained from WGI and TI), are scaled from 1 to 6 and from 1 to 
100, respectively; higher value implies better control of corruption. For the sake of 
consistency, the data for the two rent-seeking activities proxies (namely the WGI 
and TI) has been standardized from 1 to 10. The highest value for rent-seeking 
activities (measured by WGI) is 4.324, while the lowest value is 0.352; similarly, the 
average value is 3.001 and the variability is 0.839. For rent-seeking proxied by the 
TI, the highest value is 4.007, while the lowest value is 2.640; similarly, the average 
value of the data is equal to 3.270, while the variability is 0.235. Notably, the data is 
rebased in order to show that higher values indicate higher levels of rent-seeking 
activities in the LICs. 
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics and Source of Data
This table presents descriptive statistics, namely the mean, Standard Deviation (SD), maximum (Max) and minimum 
(Min) for the period 2004-2017. The variables, namely real GDP per capita growth, rent-seeking activities, total labor 
force, capital, and total population, are in the first column. The countries include Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Uganda, The Gambia, Zimbabwe. All variables are in natural logarithm.
Variable Source Unit of measurement Mean SD Min Max























formation (% of 
GDP)
0.131 0.272 -1.115 1.503
lnPOP WDI Total population 16.421 0.873 14.151 18.469
In addition, the labor force is proxied by total labor force, which is measured in 
thousands (obtained from the International Financial Statistics). Its highest value 
is 0.042, while its lowest value is -0.026; the average value for this variable is 0.027, 
while the variability is equal to 0.011. Capital formation is represented by capital 
investment/capital accumulation, measured in percentage of GDP (obtained from 
the United Nation’s Statistic Division). Its highest value is 1.503%, while its lowest 
value is -1.115%; the variability is 0.272%, while the average value is 0.131%. Lastly, 
population is proxied by total population, measured in thousands (obtained from 
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WDI, World Bank). Its highest value is 18.469, while its lowest value is equal to 
14.151, with a variability of 0.873 and an average of 16.421.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the empirical results of the dynamic panel Equation (6) using the 
system GMM estimator. In particular, the rent-seeking indicator being employed 
in the estimations in Models 1a, 1b, and 1c is the CPI obtained from WGI, whereas 
Models 2a, 2b, and 2c depict the robustness checks for the above-mentioned 
models—capturing rent-seeking by using corruption perception index obtained 
from TI. In addition, Models 1a, 1b, and 1c use the one-step system GMM, two-
step system GMM, and two-step system GMM with robust standard errors, 
respectively. Models 2a, 2b, and 2c are the robustness checks equivalent of Models 
1a, 1b, and 1c and thus use the same system GMM estimators.
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant, which implies that 
the dynamic system GMM estimator is an appropriate estimator and that the 
empirical results can be relied upon for statistical inference. The results indicate 
that rent-seeking activities negatively affect economic growth in the LICs, when 
rent-seeking is measured by both CPI indices (i.e. WGI and TI). The negative sign 
of the corruption index’s coefficient in Model 1c (WGI) suggests the existence of 
an inverse relationship between rent-seeking and economic growth—rent-seeking 
plays a role in decreasing economic growth over time. Specifically, a percentage rise 
in rent-seeking activities is associated with a 0.15 per cent fall in economic growth.
This result is in line with the findings of Paul (2010). It is also consistent with 
the missiles seek heat hypothesis (Aidt, 2016), the invertibility hypothesis (Aidt, 2016), 
and Galtung’s (1971) structural theory of imperialism. Based on Aidt’s (2016) 
missiles seek heat hypothesis of rent-seeking, the occurrence of contestable rents 
produces socially costly activities to target at winning the rents. Rent-seeking 
activities also involve social cost (a social problem in the economy) as they will 
lead to policy distortions due to the inequitable and unfair allocation of public 
resources and funds. Other rent-seeking theory also hypothesize that rent-seeking 
activities tend to decrease investment. In short, our main finding that rent-seeking 
activities impede economic growth in LICs is in line with various studies. World 
Bank defines rent-seeking activity as one of the most demonised’ variables that 
tend to retard economic growth and social development by increasing cost of 
business and creating indecisions by decreasing competency of infrastructure and 
public investment and by lowering productivity of a country.
Furthermore, the positive coefficient of capital accumulation (as shown in 
Model 1c) indicates its positive relationship with economic growth. This suggests 
that, in order to promote economic growth for LICs, capital accumulation should 
be a key focus of policymakers. In particular, a percentage increase in capital 
accumulation is associated with a 0.412 per cent increase in economic growth. This 
result further supports the idea of Solow’s (1956) growth model, which indicates 
that capital accumulation is a significant contributor to the level of production. 
Capital accumulation is also a main source of growth in endogenous growth 
theory to accelerate the economic development. The result is also consistent with 
the findings of Bal et al. (2016). 
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The estimated models are well specified as they pass all the three diagnostics 
checks. Specifically, the Sargan and Hansen test does not reject the over-
identification restriction null hypothesis. Similarly, the AR(1) test result shows a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the absence of first-order serial correlation, but 
the AR(2) test result shows no rejection of the null hypothesis of second-order 
serial correlation. 
The results obtained using the alternative measure of corruption perception 
(or rent-seeking) from TI are shown in Models 2a, 2b, and 2c. These results allow 
us to examine the validity or robustness of our main results. Based on Model 
2c, a percentage increase in rent-seeking activities will reduce economic growth 
by 0.184 per cent. The result shows consistency with the baseline result in both 
coefficient’s sign and magnitude, reinforcing that rent-seeking activities hamper 
economic growth in LICs. 
Table 3.
System GMM Results with Robustness Checks
This table shows the estimates obtained using the system GMM estimator to estimate our dynamic panel regressions. 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics, except for Sargan and Hansen test for serial correlation, which are p-values. *, **, 
and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively.
































lnRGDPGit-1 0.206*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.179** 0.332*** 0.332*
(2.90) (5.28) (2.71) (2.07) (4.49) (1.91)
lnRS(WGI) -0.00645 -0.150*** -0.150** - - -
(-0.24) (-2.59) (-1.99) - - -
lnRS(TI) - - - -0.0717 -0.184** -0.184**
- - - (-0.63) (-2.21) (-2.08)
lnLBF 0.0192 0.131 0.131 0.0211 -0.0423 -0.0423
(0.88) (1.53) (1.34) (0.88) (-0.58) (-0.35)
lnCP 0.534*** 0.412*** 0.412* 0.445** 0.446*** 0.446*
(3.93) (3.99) (1.80) (2.38) (3.79) (1.81)
lnPOP 1.634 3.900 3.900 1.269 -4.851 -4.851
(0.52) (0.53) (0.41) (0.37) (-0.98) (-0.56)
Cons 2.160*** -0.155 -0.155 2.029*** 2.336 2.336
(5.38) (-0.09) (-0.07) (3.91) (1.85) (1.00)
Number of 
Obs 247 247 247 220 220 220
Number of 
groups 19 19 19 19 19 19
Number of 
instruments 86 86 86 50 50 50
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We also performed the cross-sectional dependence test developed by Pesaran 
(2004) to check cross-sectional dependency issues in the models for the two 
different proxies of corruption perception index. Table 4 reports the results and it 
shows that the cross-sectional dependence test failed to reject the null hypothesis 
of cross-sectional independence and, therefore, we conclude that cross-sectional 
dependency issues do not drive our results. 
Table 3.
System GMM Results with Robustness Checks (Continued)
































AR1 -5.978*** -1.719* -1.674* -4.523*** -1.907* -1.777*
AR2 -1.150 -0.419 -0.369 -0.818 -0.277 -0.237
Sargan 84.68 84.68 84.68 39.31 39.31 39.31
Hansen 11.30 11.30 10.28 10.28
Table 4.
Cross-sectional Dependence Test
The table shows the cross-sectional dependence test results. Values in parentheses represent p-values.
Model 1c Model 2c
Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional 
independence 1.042(0.298) -0.051(0.959)
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION
The problem of rent-seeking is widespread and has caught the attention of various 
policymakers and researchers. A widely raised question is whether rent-seeking 
negatively influences growth. This study uses the system GMM estimator to 
estimate dynamic panel regressions of economic growth on rent-seeking in low-
income countries over the period 2004-2017. 
We find that rent-seeking has a negative and significant impact on economic 
growth in low-income countries. This finding supports the conventional view 
that rent-seeking is an impediment to economic growth, implying that efforts 
to maintain and uphold institutional quality, especially in low-income countries 
are crucial in promoting the status of low-income countries to middle-income 
countries. As such, low-income countries are advised to effectively and efficiently 
curb rent-seeking activities by actively adopting anti-rent seeking policies like anti-
corruption and anti-bribery policies to tackle individuals, who tend to participate 
in rent-seeking activities, such as giving or receiving bribery payment from third 
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parties. Besides, enforcing rules and regulation is crucial in promoting strong 
institutional quality by strengthening or streamlining bureaucracy/process of red 
tape, thus reducing rent-seeking opportunities for rent-seekers to engage in this 
process and obtain special interests/benefits. Through the right transformation 
of the institutional framework of low-income countries, rapid and sustainable 
economic growth can be achieved.
Nevertheless, recognition of the ill-effects of rent-seeking may not be sufficient 
to reverse them. For instance, a decrease in corruption level is only growth-
promoting if supported by well-structured institutions. This paradigm of self-
interest motivated revolutionary activities and, thus, the ambiguity, opens up the 
room for further innovative and more constructive research on it. Besides, future 
researchers are recommended to employ the bias corrected least square dummy 
variable estimator, which can cater for small sample sizes and small time periods 
when investigating the impact of rent-seeking on economic growth. 
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